Price stickiness asymmetry, persistence and volatility in a New Keynesian model by Flamini, A.
  
 
Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series 
 
SERP Number: 2011013  
 
 
ISSN 1749-8368 
 
 
 
 
Alessandro Flamini 
 
 
Price Stickiness Asymmetry, Persistence and Volatility  
in a New Keynesian Model 
 
May 2011 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield 
S1 4DT  
United Kingdom 
www.shef.ac.uk/economics 
 
 Abstract: 
 
In a two-sector New-Keynesian model, this paper shows that the dispersion in the degree 
of sectoral price stickiness plays a key role in the determination of the dynamics of 
aggregate inflation and, consequently, of the whole economy. The dispersion in price 
stickiness reduces the persistence of inflation and, to a smaller extent, of the interest rate. 
It also reduces the volatility of inflation, the interest rate and the output-gap. Thus two 
economies with the same average degree of price stickiness but a different variance may 
behave very differently, highlighting the relevance of sectoral data for economic 
estimations and forecasts. 
 
 
Key words: Sectoral asymmetries, price stickiness, New Keynesian model, persistence, 
volatility. 
JEL: E31, E32, E37, E52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
 I thank for comments Mustafa Caglayan, Alpay Filiztekin and Kostas Mouratidis. I 
have also benefited from a useful discussion with Paul Levine and seminar 
partecipants at the University of Surrey. 
Price Stickiness Asymmetry, Persistence and
Volatility in a New-Keynesian Model
Alessandro Flamini
May 9, 2011
Preliminary
Abstract
In a two-sector New-Keynesian model, this paper shows that the dispersion
in the degree of sectoral price stickiness plays a key role in the determination of
the dynamics of aggregate ination and, consequently, of the whole economy.
The dispersion in price stickiness reduces the persistence of ination and, to
a smaller extent, of the interest rate. It also reduces the volatility of ina-
tion, the interest rate and the output-gap. Thus two economies with the same
average degree of price stickiness but a di¤erent variance may behave very dif-
ferently, highlighting the relevance of sectoral data for economic estimations
and forecasts.
JEL Classication: E31, E32, E37, E52.
Key Words: Sectoral asymmetries, price stickiness, New Keynesian model,
persistence, volatility.
1 Introduction
A main feature of real-world economies is the presence of multi sectors. How sectoral
asymmetry relates to the working of an economy is therefore an issue potentially very
important for the estimations and simulations of macro models. This paper focuses on
sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness and asks how it a¤ects the economic dynamics.
Drawing on Benigno (2004) and Woodford (2003), the current paper addresses this
question presenting a two-sector New Keynesian model with the assumption of habit
persistence.
Current address: Department of Economics, University of She¢ eld, 9 Mappin Street, She¢ eld
S1 4DT, UK. Email: a.amini@she¢ eld.ac.uk. I thank for comments Mustafa Caglayan, Alpay
Filiztekin and Kostas Mouratidis. I have also beneted from a useful discussion with Paul Levine
and seminar partecipants at the University of Surrey. Any mistake is my responsability.
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Sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness in the New-Keynesian model has been
pioneered by Aoky (2001) and Benigno (2004). Both papers show that focusing
the policy response on the sector with sticky or stickier price maximises welfare.
Abstracting from optimal monetary policy and considering sectoral asymmetry in
wage contracts Dixon and Kara (2010a) show that in economies with the same average
contract length, monetary shocks are more persistent in presence of longer contracts.
They also show in Dixon and Kara (2010b) that accounting for the distribution
of contract length substantially improves the ability of the model to replicate the
ination persistence found in the data.
The contribution of this paper lies in showing that sectoral asymmetry in price
stickiness play a key role in the determination of the aggregate ination process
and, via ination, of the interest rate and aggregate output gap processes. The
analysis shows that the dispersion in sectoral price stickiness a¤ects negatively the
persistence of aggregate ination and, to a minor extent, of the interest rate. It
also a¤ects negatively the variability of aggregate ination, the interest rate and the
output-gap. The analysis suggests that these results are quantitatively important
too. Interestingly, these ndings imply that two economies sharing the mean degree
of price stickiness but not the variance may respond to exogenous disturbances very
di¤erently.
The intuition for these ndings is the following. Breaking the symmetry in sec-
toral price stickiness introduces the relative price of sectoral goods into the picture
which, a¤ecting sectoral inations in opposite ways, changes dramatically the shock
transmission mechanism of the economy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model where con-
sumption habits are introduced into a two-sector New-Keynesian model. It derives
the non-linear optimal conditions, shows the existence and uniqueness of the steady
state, the log-linearized relations used in the following analysis, and the calibration
of the structural parameters. Section 3 investigates the relation between sectoral
asymmetry in price stickiness and the dynamics of the economy in presence of shocks
to the price level, technology and the preferences of the household. Specically, the
analysis is carried out via impulse response functions, autocorrelations, and standard
deviations of the endogenous variables. Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of unit mass of identical innite-lived
households each seeking to maximize
Ut = Et
1X
T=t
T t
8<:eu  CT   CT 1;CT  
1Z
0
ev [HT (j)] dj
9=;
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where  is the intertemporal discount factor, Ct represents all interest-rate-sensitive
expenditure including investments and is dened as a CES aggregate
Ct 
h
(ns)
1= (Cst )
( 1)= + (nm)
1= (Cmt )
( 1)=
i=( 1)
(1)
of the goods Cst and C
m
t which are produced, respectively, by the s and m-sector,
with  dening their elasticity of substitution and ns and nm (ns  1  nm) denoting
the number of goods of sector s and m in Ct; respectively. Each sectoral good is, in
turn, a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods produced in
the sector:
Cst 

ns
  1
s
Z ns
0
(Cst (i))
1  1
s di
 s
s 1
; Cmt 

nm
  1
m
Z 1
ns
(Cmt (i))
1  1
m di
 m
m 1
(2)
where k > 1; k = s;m; is the sectoral elasticity of substitution between any two
di¤erentiated goods. Period preferences on consumption and labour are modeled as
CRRA functions
eu  Ct   Ct 1;Ct = C 1et (Ct   Ct 1)1  1e   11  1e ; (3)ev [Ht (j)]  H1+t (j)
1 + 
; (4)
where Ct is an exogenous preference shock, Ht (j) is the quantity supplied of labour
of type j; e > 0 captures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
0   < 1 measures the degree of habit persistence, and  > 0 is the inverse of the
elasticity of goods production. The price index for the minimum cost of a unit of Ct
is given by
Pt 

ns (P
s
t )
1  + (nm) (Pmt )
1 1=(1 ) ; (5)
with P s; Pm denoting, respectively, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for goods produced
in the s and m sector
P st 
24(ns) 1 nsZ
0
ps (i)1 s di
35 11 s ; Pmt 
24(nm) 1 1Z
ns
pm (i)1 m di
35
1
1 m
:
Preferences captured by equation (1) imply that the optimal sectoral consumption
levels are given by
Cst = nsCt

P st
Pt
 
; (6)
Cmt = nmCt

Pmt
Pt
 
: (7)
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Financial markets are assumed to be complete so that at any date all households face
the same budget constraint and consume the same amount. Then, utility maximiza-
tion subject to the budget constraint and the no-Ponzi scheme requirement yields the
condition for optimal consumption
t = Et
(euc  Ct+1   Ct;Ct+1  Eteuc  Ct+2   Ct+1;Ct+2euc  Ct   Ct 1;Ct  Eteuc  Ct+1   Ct;Ct+1 PtPt+1
)
; (8)
where t  11+it is the price of a one-period nominal bond. Finally, utility maximiza-
tion requires that the optimal supply of labour of type j is given by

t (j) = 	t
evh [Ht (j)]euc  Ct   Ct 1;Ct  Eteuc  Ct+1   Ct;Ct+1 ; (9)
where 
t (j) is the real wage demanded for labour of type j and	t  1 is an exogenous
markup factor in the labor market assuming that rms are wage-takers. Given (2),
sectoral aggregate demands are
Y st 
24 1
ns
nsZ
0
[yst (j)]
s 1
s dj
35 
s
s 1
; Y mt 
24 1
nm
1Z
n
[ymt (j)]
m 1
m dj
35
m
m 1
:
Turning to production, each household i is assumed to supply all type of labour
and is a monopolistically competitive producer of one di¤erentiated good, either ym (i)
or ys (i) : In this economy any rm i belongs to an industry j which, in turn, belongs
either to sector s or m: Furthermore, there is a unit interval continuum of industries
indexed by j and in each industry there is a unit interval continuum of good indexed
by i so that the total number of goods is one. Since in equilibrium all the rms
belonging to an industry will supply the same amount, they will also demand the
same amount of labour. As a result the total demand of labour in an industry is
equal to demand of labor of any di¤erentiated rm in the industry. Next, we assume
industry-specic labor as the only variable input and a sector-specic technology
yst (i) = At [H
s
t (i)]
1
s ;
ymt (i) = At [H
m
t (i)]
1
m ;
where At is a technology shock, Hst (i) ; H
m
t (i) are the quantities of labour used by
the representative rm i in the s and m-sector to produce good i respectively, and
k > 1; k = s;m is the elasticity of sectoral output with respect to hours worked:
Thus the input requirement functions are
Hst =

yst (i)
At
s
; (10)
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Hmt =

ymt (i)
At
m
; (11)
then, accounting for the preferences (1-2) the quantity demanded for each individual
good in the manufacturing and services sector are, respectively,
yst (i) = C
s
t (i)
= Ct

pst (i)
P st
 s P st
Pt
 
; (12)
and
ymt (i) = C
m
t (i)
= Ct

pmt (i)
Pmt
 m Pmt
Pt
 
: (13)
In equilibrium, market clearing in the goods market requires
Y mt = C
m
t ; (14)
Y st = C
s
t ; (15)
Yt = Ct; (16)
Then, combining (3), (8), and (16) we obtain the nonlinear version of the aggregate
demand. Turning to the producerspricing behaviour, rms in both sectors x their
prices at random intervals following the Calvo (1983) staggered price model and have
the opportunity to change their prices with probability (1  ). Thus, a producer i
in the h = m; s sector that is allowed to set its price in period t chooses its new price
for the random period starting in t; epht ; to maximize the ow of expected prots:
maxepht Et
1X
T=t
T tt;T
8<:epht yhT (i) 

yhT (i)
AT
h
	hT

yhT (j) =AT
h
C
1e
t (Ct   Ct 1) 
1e   C 1et+1 (Ct+1   Ct) 
1e PT
9=; ;
where t;T is the stochastic discount factor by which nancial markets discount ran-
dom nominal income in period T: Accounting for rm i demand function in sector
h; and considering that the rms pricing decision cannot change the real wage, the
f.o.c. is
0 = Et
1X
T=t
T tt;T
(
CT
 epht
P hT
 h P hT
PT
 
  hCT
 epht
P hT
 h 1 epht
P hT

P hT
PT
 
 
(17)
"
 hh

CT
AT
h  epht
P hT
 hh 1 1
P hT

P hT
PT
 h# 	hT Ct pht (j)Pht  h PhtPt   1AT
h
C
1e
T (CT   CT 1) 
1e   C 1eT+1 (CT+1   CT ) 
1e PT
9>>>=>>>; :
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2.1 Existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium
In presence of exible prices, the monopolistic competitive representative rm i in
sector m sets the optimal price epmt in any period to maximize the period prot
maxepmt
(epmt ymt (i)  ymt (i)Amt
m "
	mt
evh [Ht (j)]euc  Ct   Ct 1;Ct  Eteuc  Ct+1   Ct;Ct+1Pt
#)
;
and the f.o.c. consists of setting the price as a mark-up on marginal costs
epmt = (   1)m

ymt (i)
Amt
m 1 "
	mt
evh [Ht (j)]euc  Ct   Ct 1;Ct  euc  Ct+1   Ct;Ct+1Pt
#
:
Let sm be the real marginal cost in the m sector
sm

ymt (i) ; Ct;
P st
Pmt
; t

 m

ymt (i)
Amt
m 1 " 	mt evh [ymt (i)]euc  Ct   Ct 1;Ct  euc  Ct+1   Ct;Ct+1 PtPmt
#
;
(18)
where "real" is with respect to the price of the composite good in them sector. Notice
that accounting for (5) we obtain
Pt
Pmt
=

ns
 
Q1 t   1

+ 1
 1
1  ; (19)
and
Pt
P st
=

nm
 
Q 1t   1

+ 1
 1
1  ; (20)
where Qt  P
s
t
Pmt
; so that sm turns out to be a function only of (ymt (i) ; Ct; Qt; 
m
t )
where mt 
 
Amt ;	
m
t ; Ct
0
is a vector of shocks. Then the f.o.c. can be rewritten as
epmt
Pmt
=
m
(m   1)s
m (ymt (i) ; Ct; Qt; 
m
t ) : (21)
Now, rearranging the demand for good i in sector m given by (13) we obtain
pmt (i)
Pmt
=
[ymt (i)]
  1
m
C
  1
m
t

Pmt
Pt
  
m
:
Then, accounting for (21) the supply of good i must satisfy
[ymt (i)]
  1
m
C
  1
m
t

Pmt
Pt
  
m
=
m
(m   1)s
m (ymt (i) ; Ct; Qt; 
m
t ) :
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Now notice that the LHS and the RHS are, respectively, decreasing and increasing
in ymt (i). Thus there is only one value of y
m
t (i) that satises the previous equation
given (Ct; Y st ; Qt). In equilibrium all the rms in the m-sector produce the same
quantity so that it must be that ymt (i) = Y
m
t : Hence
[Y mt ]
  1
m
C
  1
m
t

Pmt
Pt
  
m
=
m
(m   1)s
m (Y mt ; Ct; Qt; 
m
t ) ;
and accounting for (18) and (19) we obtain
[Y mt ]
  1
m
C
  1
m
t

Pmt
Pt
  
m
=
m
(m   1)m

Y mt
Amt
m 1 [ymt (j) =Amt ]m [ns (Q1    1) + 1] 11 h
C
1e
t (Ct   Ct 1) 
1e   C 1et+1jt
 
Ct+1jt   Ct
  1e i ;
which, assuming no shocks and accounting for (7) and (14-16) boils down to
(m   1)
mm
=
[Y m]m+ 1
(1  ) [(1  )Y ]  1e

nsQ
1  + nm
 1
1  : (22)
Similarly for the other sector
(s   1)
ss
=
[Y s]s+s 1
(1  ) [(1  )Y ]  1e

ns + nm (Q)
 1 11  : (23)
Now accounting for (6-7) and the sectoral market clearing conditions (14-16) and
(19-20) we obtain
Y m = nmY

ns (Q)
1  + nm
 
1  ; (24)
Y s = nsY

ns + nm (Q)
 1 1  ; (25)
thus we have to solve a system of four equations (22-25) in four unknowns (Y m; Y s; Y;Q) :
2.2 Log-linearized relations
I now log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the steady state where the
variables

Y mt ; Y
s
t ; Yt; Qt;
Pt+1
Pt
;
P st+1
P st
;
Pmt+1
Pmt

are equal to (Y m; Y s; Y;Q; 1; 1; 1) and all
the shocks are equal to one: Loglinearizing the Euler equation account being taken
of the market clearing condition leads to the aggregate demand
yt =

1 +  (1 + )
yt 1 +
1 +  (1 + )
1 +  (1 + )
yt+1jt   
1 +  (1 + )
yt+2jt
(26)
 e (1  ) (1  )
(1 +  + 2)
bit   t+1jt+ 1  
1 +  (1 + )

ct   ( + 1) ct+1jt + ct+2jt

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where ct  logCt and loglinearizing the f.o.c. for the rms problem (17) with respect
to sector m and s we obtain
mt = 
m

!m + '
 
1 + 2

yt   m'yt 1   m'yt+1jt + mQs (!m + 1) qt
(27)
  m (1 + !m) at + ' (1  )  ct   ct+1jt   mt + mt+1jt
and
st = 
s

!s + '
 
1 + 2

yt   s'yt 1   s'yt+1jt   sQm (!s + 1) qt
(28)
  s (1 + !s) at + ' (1  )  ct   ct+1jt   st+ st+1jt
where at  logAt;  ht  	ht ; h = s;m and
Q
s  nsQ
1 
ns (Q1    1) + 1 ; Q
m
= 1 Qs; !h  h (v + 1)  1;
h 
 
1  h  1  h
h (1 + !hh)
; h = m; s; '  1
(1  ) e (1  ) ;
and the exogenous shocks follow
at+1 = aat + "
a
t+1;
ct+1 = cct + "
c
t+1;
 st+1 =   
s
t + "
 s
t+1;
 mt+1 =   
m
t + "
 m
t+1;
where Et
 
"ht+1

= 0; h = a; c;  s;  m: Log-linearizing the price index (5) we obtain
aggregate ination
t = (1  en)st + enmt ; en  nmns (Q1    1) + 1 ; (29)
and substituting the sectoral inations we obtain aggregate ination in terms of
lagged, current, and expected output gap, the relative price, expected ination, and
the exogenous shocks
t =

(1  en)s !s + '  1 + 2+ enm !m + '  1 + 2	 yt   ' [(1  en)s + enm] yt 1
 ' [(1  en)s + enm] yt+1jt   (1  en)sQm (!s + 1)  enmQs (!m + 1) qt
  (1  en)s [(1 + !s) at    st ]  enm [(1 + !m) at    mt ]
 ' (1  ) [(1  en)s + enm]  ct   ct+1jt+ t+1jt
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Finally, dening qt  log QtQ , the law of motion for the log deviation of the relative
price from its steady state value is given by
qt = qt 1 + st   mt : (30)
The model is closed with a Taylor rule describing the behaviour of the central bank
it = 0it 1 + (1  0) 1t + (1  0) 2yt:
2.3 Calibration
The degree of habits persistence is  = 0:8; the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption is e = 0:638; the elasticity of substitution between Cst and Cmt in the
CES consumption aggregate is  = 3; the number of rms in the s-sector is ns = 0:5;
and in the m-sector is nm = 1   ns; the elasticity of sectoral output with respect to
hours worked is h = 1:333; h = s;m; the inverse of the elasticity of goods production
is  = 1; the sectoral elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erentiated goods
is h = 7:88; h = s;m; the intertemporal discount factor is  = 0:99; the coe¢ cients
of the Taylor rule are 0 = 0:8; 1 = 1:5; 2 = 0:5=4; the AR coe¢ cients of the
exogenous processes are a =  = c = 0:95 and for any shock the variance is
2" = 0:009
2: Finally, the sectoral degree of price stickiness h; h = s;m is let free to
vary in the range f0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9g as described in the analysis below.
3 Sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness and eco-
nomic dynamics
This section studies the relation between sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness and
the dynamics of the economy in presence of exogenous positive shocks to the price
level, technology and the preferences of the household. All the shocks are supposed
to hit symmetrically both sectors. Through impulse response functions, autocor-
relations, and variances of the endogenous variables, the analysis combines three
perspectives to investigate qualitatively and quantitatively the relation at issue.
3.1 IRFs analysis
Figures 1-3 show the impulse response functions to a preference shock and to symmet-
ric cost-push and technology shocks in presence of sectoral symmetry and asymmetry
in the degree of price stickiness. Starting with Panels 1a-3a, each gure reports the
symmetric case, rst row (s = m = 0:5); and two asymmetric cases di¤ering in
the degree of sectoral asymmetry, second and third row (s = 0:7; m = 0:5 and
s = 0:9; m = 0:5): What is interesting here is that each panel reveals a common
9
behaviour of aggregate ination in response to an increasing degree of price stickiness
asymmetry. This behaviour can be stated as follows:
Result 1: Price Stickiness Asymmetries and Aggregate Ination. For any
shock considered, the larger the asymmetry in price stickiness, the lower the deviation
of aggregate ination from its steady state value, the lower the initial impact of the
shock and the lower the persistence of the response to the shock.
This result has signicant implications on the behaviour of the interest rate. To
describe them, it is important to note that the cost-push shock and the technology
shock a¤ect the economy only from the supply side, while the preference shock also
from the demand side1. Furthermore, the impact of the preference shock on the
demand and supply side goes in opposite directions2. This, as explained below,
implies that sectoral asymmetry, via ination, play a di¤erent role on the dynamics
of the interest rate with a preference shock and with a cost-push or technology shock.
Starting with the preference shock, panel 1a shows a positive and negative impact
of the shock on the output gap and ination, respectively. Now, under symmetry,
rst row, the fall in ination a¤ects the interest rate via the Taylor rule more than
the increase in the output gap. As a result the interest rate falls considerably in the
initial periods. Yet, breaking the symmetry, second and third row, Result 1 implies
that ination is less a¤ected by the shock and, therefore the negative impact on the
interest rate is attenuated. This leaves the interest rate more exposed to the positive
impact of the output gap and consequently the monetary policy turns out to be more
active in the subsequent periods.
On the other hand, in presence of a cost-push or technology shock (panel 2a and
3a respectively), the shock hits the economy only through the supply side. Thus
Result 1 implies that the larger the asymmetry, the less the shock passes through to
the rest of the economy, specically, the lower the deviations of the output-gap from
its steady state value, and the less active the monetary policy.
Summing up, Result 1 implies that sectoral asymmetry plays a key role in ampli-
fying or attenuating the deviations of the interest rate from its long run equilibrium
according to the type of the shock that hits the economy.
The analysis based on Panels 1a-3a provides a useful starting point to illustrate
how sectoral asymmetry a¤ect the behaviour of aggregate ination and Result 1
helps to x the ideas. Yet, it does not disentangle the impact of the mean and the
variance in the degree of sectoral price stickiness on aggregate ination. Indeed,
1The latter has this peculiarity as shocks to the utility function a¤ect on the one hand the Euler
equation and therefore the aggregate demand and, on the other hand, they a¤ect the marginal
rate of substitution between labour and consumption entering in the optimal supply of labour, and
therefore the aggregate supply.
2Indeed in equation (??) the coe¢ cient of the preference shock is negative and in equation (26)
it is positive.
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both moments increases when s increases. This issue leads to ask to what extent,
if any, two economies sharing the same mean degree of price stickiness but di¤ering
in terms of variance respond di¤erently to exogenous disturbances. Panels 1b-3b,
address this question reporting on the rst row an economy with symmetric sectors
where price stickiness is the same in both sectors, specically s = m = 0:7; and
in the second row an economy with asymmetric sectors with the same mean of the
symmetric economy, i.e.  = 0:7; but di¤erent sectoral price stickiness, specically
s = 0:9; m = 0:5: Interestingly, the analysis reveals an important relation between
the variance of sectoral price stickiness and the behavior of aggregate ination that
can be stated as follows
Corollary 1: Variance of Sectoral Price Stickiness and Aggregate Ina-
tion. For any shock considered, for a given mean value of price stickiness, the larger
the variance (i.e. the larger the asymmetry), the lower the deviation of ination from
its steady state value, the lower the initial impact of the shock and the lower the
persistence of the response to the shock.
What are the implications of Corollary 1 on the behaviour of the two economies?
Panel 1b refers to the response of the two economies to a preference shock. In the
asymmetric case the initial and subsequent response of the interest rate is, respec-
tively, lower and higher than in the symmetric case. This is due to the fact that
breaking the symmetry the impact of the shock on ination is attenuated. Conse-
quently, a minor initial decrease of the interest rate is required to stabilize ination
and thus monetary policy can focus more on the stabilization of the output gap by
increasing the interest rate. In term of the output gap, this policy results in a better
stabilization for the asymmetric economy.
Panel 2b and 2c refer to the response of the two economies to a cost-push and a
technology shock respectively. They show that the policy response in the asymmetric
economy is half as active as in the symmetric one and, similarly, that the deviations
of output-gap and ination from their steady state values in the asymmetric economy
tend to be half as large as in the symmetric economy.
Summing up, the economy featuring higher dispersion in sectoral price stickiness
is less perturbed by exogenous disturbances and tends to exhibit a less active policy.
These ndings will be assessed quantitatively in the following analysis yet, before
deepening the investigation with the study of the autocorelation and standard devi-
ation of the endogenous variables, it is worth stopping for a natural question: what
drives these ndings? to explain the mechanism at work we rst notice that breaking
the symmetry introduces a new variable and a new relation into the working of the
economy. The new variable is the relative price of the sectoral goods which appears,
as a log-deviation, in the second and third row of Figures 1a-3a and in the second
row of Figures 1b-3b. The new relation is a relation between the relative price and
sectoral inations. With symmetry, sectoral inations coincide and thus the relative
price Qt is constant and equal to its steady state value Q so that qt = 0: Breaking
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the symmetry, a symmetric shock hits sectoral inations di¤erently: the stickier the
sectoral price, the smaller the impact of the shock3. Thus sectoral inations start
to di¤er and qt enters the picture driven by its low of motion (30). But the relation
between qt and sectoral inations works in the other direction too. Indeed, the pres-
ence of the relative price activates a switching demand mechanism that, in presence
of a symmetric shock, acts asymmetrically on the sectoral inations: it o¤sets the
shock in the sector hit more and strengthens it in the sector hit less4. Since the o¤-
setting action outpaces the magnifying action, this mechanism reduces the di¤erence
between sectoral inations caused by the shock. Yet, given the law of motion of qt; as
long as the sign of the di¤erence between sectoral inations generated by the shock
does not change, the relative price continues to increase its deviation from the steady
state amplifying the switching demand mechanism. This process inexorably leads to
a turning point for qt where the impact of the switching demand mechanism exceeds
the impact of the shock, the di¤erence in sectoral inations changes sign, and qt starts
to go in the opposite direction converging to its steady state value. This is illustrated
by the hump-shaped path of qt shown in Figure 1-3. To conclude, the relation be-
tween qt and sectoral inations results in di¤erent paths for the latter which, in turn,
a¤ect the behaviour of aggregate ination and the rest of the economy.
3.2 Autocorrelation analysis: sectoral asymmetry in price
stickiness and the persistence of y; i; and 
The Impulse Response analysis has signalled an important impact of sectoral asym-
metry in the degree of price stickiness on the dynamics of the economy. In order to
characterize this impact further, it is useful to focus on the persistence of y; i; and .
Adopting as persistence measure the sum of the rst ve autocorrelation coe¢ cients,
Figure 4 illustrates the case of sectoral symmetry and plots the persistence of the en-
dogenous variables against price stickiness. The graphic shows that when the average
degree of price stickiness increases from 0:5 to 0:9; the persistence of the ination
variables (which is the same in the symmetric case as sectoral and aggregate ina-
tion coincide) increases too. This is due to the price stickiness mechanism itself that
bu¤ering changes in marginal costs caused by exogenous disturbances tends to insu-
late ination generating more persistence5. The increase in ination persistence leads
in turn to an increase in the interest rate persistence. Interestingly, these ndings
starkly contrast with the ones provided by the sectoral asymmetry case illustrated in
Figure 5. Here the graphic plots the persistence of the endogenous variables against
3This can be seen in the sectoral AS, equations (27-28) noting that  in the coe¢ cient of the
shocks is inversely related to the degree of price stickiness :
4This can be seen in the equations for sectoral inations (27-28) where the coe¢ cients for qt have
opposite signs.
5This can be observed in the ination equations noticing that the composite coe¢ cient  is
inversely related to the degree of price stickiness :
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the degree of price stickiness in the s-sector keeping constant the degree of price stick-
iness in the m-sector at m = 0:5. Due to the mechanism that generates Results 1
explained above, the persistence of the m-sector ination falls, and falls more than
the increase in the persistence in the s-sector. Thus, the persistence of aggregate in-
ation up to s = 0:7 rises faintly and then falls more and more markedly. As in the
symmetric case, the interest rate persistence tends to mirror the aggregate ination
persistence.
This analysis has shown that sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness is a key fac-
tor determining the persistence of ination and the interest rate. Disentangling the
variance e¤ect from the mean e¤ect we consider two economies that share the same
mean degree of sectoral asymmetry but a di¤erent variance. Setting the mean degree
of sectoral asymmetry equal to 0:7; Figure 4, for s = m = 0:7; provides the persis-
tence of the endogenous variables for an economy with zero variance and Figure 5 for,
s = 0:9 and m = 0:5; provides the persistence of the endogenous variables for an
economy with positive variance equal to 0:04. Then the persistence measures reveal
that increasing the dispersion in sectoral price stickiness, but keeping the same mean
value, leads to a signicant reduction in the persistence of aggregate ination and to
a modest reduction in the persistence of the interest rate. Specically, ination and
interest rate persistence falls, respectively, of 23.3% and 5.5%.
Summing up, the autocorrelation analysis suggests that the relation between the
dispersion in price stickiness asymmetry and the persistence of ination and the
interest rate, which was revealed by the impulse response function analysis, is quan-
titatively important.
3.3 Unconditional Variances analysis: sectoral asymmetry in
price stickiness and economic stability
As shown in the impulse response analysis, the introduction of sectoral asymmetry
in price stickiness tends to reduce the deviations of ; i; and y from their long
run values. A convenient way to measure these deviations consists of computing
the unconditional standard deviations of the endogenous variables. Starting with
the symmetric case, Figure 6 plots the standard deviation of ; i; and y against the
degree of price stickiness shared by the sectors. The graphic shows that the stickier the
price level, the more stable the endogenous variables. As explained above, the sticky
price mechanism itself tends to lter out the exogenous disturbances delivering more
stability. Moving to the asymmetric case, Figure 7 plots standard deviations against
the degree of price stickiness in the s-sector keeping the degree of price stickiness in
the other sector constant. Comparing the gures, two economies that in terms of price
stickiness share the average but not the variance exhibit very di¤erent variability of
the endogenous variables. Indeed, keeping the average price stickiness equal to 0:7
and breaking the sectoral symmetry the variability of y; i; and  decrease of the
32.6%, 48.9% and 48.9%, respectively. Thus sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness
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plays a key role in determining the variability of the endogenous variables.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates how sectoral asymmetry in price stickiness a¤ect the dynamics
of the economy in a two-sector New Keynesian model with habits in consumption.
When sectoral symmetry is broken, the relative price between sectoral inations
appears into the New Keynesian economy and signicantly alters its response to
exogenous shocks. As a result, asymmetry in sectoral price stickiness leads to an im-
portant fall in the persistence of ination and in the volatility of ination, the interest
rate and the output gap. It also leads to a moderate fall in the persistence of the
interest rate. Thus, two economies di¤ering in the dispersion of sectoral asymmetry
but not in the mean may exhibit very unlike volatility and persistence.
Further analysis will take the model to the data and investigate how sectoral size
and strategic complementarities a¤ect the relation between sectoral asymmetry in
price stickiness and the dynamics of the economy.
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Figure 1a. IRFs to a preferences shock under symmetry and  asymmetry in sectoral price stickiness.
Symmetry: αs = αm = 0.5
Asymmetry: αs = 0.7, αm =  0.5
Asymmetry: αs = 0.9,  αm = 0.5
Figure 1b. IRFs to a preference shock in two economies with the same mean degree of sectoral 
price stickiness but a different variance. 
Symmetry: αs = αm = 0.7
Asymmetry: αs = 0.9, αm = 0.5
Figure2a. IRFs to a cost-push shock under symmetry and  asymmetry in sectoral price stickiness
Symmetry: αs = αm = 0.5
Figure 2b. IRFs to a cost-push shock in two economies with the same mean degree of sectoral 
price stickiness but a different variance. 
Asymmetry: αs = 0.7, αm =  0.5
Asymmetry: αs = 0.9,  αm = 0.5
Symmetry: αs = αm = 0.7
Asymmetry: αs = 0.9, αm = 0.5
Figure 3a. IRFs to a technology shock under symmetry and  asymmetry in sectoral price stickiness.
Figure 3b. IRFs to a technology shock in two economies with the same mean degree of sectoral 
price stickiness but a different variance. 
Asymmetry: αs = 0.7, αm =  0.5
Symmetry: αs = αm = 0.7
Asymmetry: αs = 0.9,  αm = 0.5
Symmetry: αs = αm = 0.5
Asymmetry: αs = 0.9, αm = 0.5
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Figure 4. Persistence in terms of the sum of the first five autocorrelation coefficients and 
symmetric price stickiness.
Figure 5. Persistence in terms of the sum of the first five autocorrelation coefficients and 
asymmetric price stickiness under αm = 0.5 and 0.5 ≤ αs ≤ 0.9.
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Figure 6. Standard deviation and symmetric price stickiness.
Figure 7. Standard deviation and asymmetric price stickiness under αm = 0.5 and 0.5 ≤ αs ≤ 0.9.
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